



## Report

Date: 15 March 2019 Security BUDGET SENS	ITIVE
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Level:

To: Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, Minister for Child Poverty Reduction

Hon Carmel Sepuloni, Minister for Social Development

## Indexation Budget Bid: Key Policy Decisions

#### **Purpose of the report**

This report seeks key policy decisions to help the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) and the Child Poverty Unit (CPU) finalise a Budget 2019 bid for changes to the indexation settings of selected income support payments.

#### **Executive Summary**

In recent advice to the Ministers for Social Development and Child Poverty Reduction, MSD and CPU officials noted that there was a strong case for changes to the way social assistance is adjusted from year-to-year. Changes to indexation would ensure that the incomes of beneficiaries are maintained in relation to the cost of living, and do not progressively fall further behind those of other New Zealanders. Such changes would also support the Government's objectives for child poverty reduction, and make a significant contribution towards the achievement of its ten-year child poverty targets (DPMC 2018/19-902 and REP/19/2/146 refers).

3	The Minister for Child Poverty Reduction has indicated that she would like to submit a
	budget bid for the indexation of main benefit rates to wages \$ 9(2)(f)(iv)

4 This report provides updated costings, including any implementation costs, and seeks your decisions on the following matters:

•	Confirming which payments are covered by the proposal – The rationale for
	changes to indexation for Budget 2019 is strongest for benefit rates \$ 9(2)(f)(iv)
•	s 9(2)(f)(iv)


	•	rates – We are seekin	g your direction o	pproach used for inde on the methodology used, both inflation and wages,	and whether to
	•	s 9(2)(f)(iv)			
		Confirming the comm		tion We are earling w	our direction on
	•	which elements of the	e new indexation	tion – We are seeking your regime should be set do sof any such legislation cal	own in primary
5	s 9(	2)(f)(iv)			
Re	econ	nmended actions			
Ιt	is reco	ommended that you:			
1		•	ndexation for Bud	lget 2019 should be cons	idered as a first
		s 9(2)(f)(iv)			
2	_	ee to include a budget bi ementation date for the	_	indexation settings, with a	an
		Prime Minister Ardern	Yes/No	Minister Sepuloni	Yes/No
3	Agre	ee that the budget bid w	ill be for <b>either</b> :		
		wage-indexing main ben- forecast period; <b>or</b>	efit rates only, at	an estimated cost of \$31	4m over the
		Prime Minister Ardern	Yes/No	Minister Sepuloni	Yes/No
	3.2	s 9(2)(f)(iv)			
		Prime Minister Ardern	Yes/No	Minister Sepuloni	Yes/No
	3.3	s 9(2)(f)(iv)			
		Prime Minister Ardern	Yes/No	Minister Sepuloni	Yes/No
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
Minister Sepuloni

Yes/No

Prime Minister Ardern

Yes/No





- 14 **Note** that should you wish to proceed with a budget bid, officials will provide you and relevant portfolio Ministers with further advice which:
  - summarises the key decisions made
  - provides final advice on the short and long-term fiscal implications and poverty impacts
  - depending on your decisions in this paper, provide any further necessary advice to finalise the bid – for example, on the proposed legislative process
  - provides a letter from relevant portfolio Ministers to the Minister of Finance to submit a Budget Bid.
- 15 **Forward** this report to the Ministers of Finance, Revenue, Housing and Urban Development, and Children.

Prime Minister Ardern	Yes/No	Minister Sepuloni	Yes/No
Kristie Carter Director Child Poverty Unit		Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern Prime Minister Minister for Child Pov	erty Reduction
/2019		/2019	
s 9(2)(a)  Policy Manager Income Support Policy Ministry of Social Developmen	t	Hon Carmel Sepuloni <b>Minister for Social De</b>	velopment
/2019		/2019	

## **Background**

- On 1 March 2019, officials from MSD and DPMC provided the Ministers for Child Poverty Reduction and Social Development with a briefing on potential options for changes to the indexation regime of income support payments. The options were consistent with the indexation recommendations of the Welfare Expert Advisory Group (WEAG) and considered the potential implications of the broader recommendations of the WEAG (DPMC 2018/19-902 and REP/19/2/146 refers).
- As noted in previous advice, there is a strong case to be made for wage indexation of payment rates, especially for main benefits \$9(2)(f)(iv)

  Such an approach would ensure the living standards of low-income families are broadly maintained relative to the living standards of broader New Zealand society.
- On the basis of this advice, the Minister for Child Poverty Reduction has indicated that she would like to submit a Budget bid for the indexation of main benefit rates to wages \$\frac{9(2)(f)(iv)}{2}\$
- These changes are able to be implemented from 1 April 2020 as part of the MSD Annual General Adjustment (AGA) process and Inland Revenue's annual updates. There are no implementation costs for MSD as the changes will be incorporated into existing AGA processes. There are no additional systems cost for Inland Revenue and any additional operational costs are expected to be minor.



## Confirming which payments are covered by the Budget 2019 bid

14	We are seeking your decisions on whether the indexation changes would cover main
	benefits, s 9(2)(f)(iv)
	Benefit rates \$ 9(2)(f)(iv)
	are the payments that have the biggest impact on income adequacy of the lowest-
	income individuals and families, \$9(2)(f)(iv)
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15	\$ 9(2)(f)(IV)
16	s 9(2)(f)(iv)
17	NATURE independence of manifestation of manifestation and an income of the manifestation in the character and in
17	Wage indexation of main benefits may also impact on relativities in the broader social
	assistance system. For example, if Student Allowance rates continue to be CPI
	adjusted, benefit rates may become higher than student allowance rates over the long-
	term, creating a disincentive for beneficiaries to enter study. S 9(2)(f)(iv)
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18 It is also important to note that, because of interdependencies within the welfare system, changes to income support settings such as indexation can have automatic flow-ons to levels of support for other assistance (such as the Minimum Family Tax Credit and Temporary Additional Support). This means certain payments will automatically increase at the same time, in line with the intended purpose of these payments.

#### Confirming the wage index used for adjusting rates

Indexation of New Zealand Superannuation

19 New Zealand already has an existing approach to wage indexation, used for adjusting rates of New Zealand Superannuation and Veteran's Pension (NZS/VP). Legislation sets out a two-step process that must be followed for the annual adjustment of rates of NZS/VP:

- the net weekly rates must be adjusted on 1 April each year in line with any annual percentage increase in the CPI for the year ending the previous 31 December
- the net weekly amount payable to a married/civil union/de facto couple must not be less than 65%, or more than 72.5%, of the net average wage<sup>2</sup>.
- Further, the Government has made a commitment to ensure that the net married rate of NZS is not set below 66% of the net average wage. This approach is also known as a 'wage band' approach, where payment rates cannot fall below or rise above a certain wage level. Since 2007, NZS has been at the bottom of this 'wage floor', which means that rates have moved with average wages for the past decade or so.
- One of the benefits with a wage band approach is that it protects the real incomes of NZS recipients if inflation is ever higher than wages. If this situation occurs, NZS rates would increase in line with inflation and move above the wage floor. It is worth noting that net wage growth has consistently been higher than CPI growth over the past decade.

#### A wage band approach

- You could consider using a similar 'wage band' approach for main benefit rates (2)

  This would involve further consideration of what an appropriate wage band be, as well as determine what the relativities 'should be' between different rates for various family types.
- 23 NZS has a relatively simple rate structure compared to the benefit system. The benefit system has significantly more payment rates because different rates are paid depending on family and benefit type.
- 24 Determining such an appropriate level would be challenging, particularly for Budget 2019. We do not recommend progressing with such an approach for Budget 2019 ahead of the response to the WEAG's recommendations, particularly given they recommend significant changes to the level of main benefits and relativities between the rates.

#### A wage growth approach

- As indexing payment rates to wages is primarily about maintaining relative changes over time, an alternative approach is to simply adjust payment levels by the growth rate in net average wages (i.e. no wage band is applied). Such an approach is currently used for Paid Parental Leave.
- This would likely have the same outcome over the long term as the wage band approach. There is a small chance of small year-to-year differences when the CPI is higher than wage growth (as the wage band approach protects real incomes), but this is unlikely, and it is also arguable that this is appropriate, if your objective for indexation is to maintain relativities of standard of living.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The single living alone and single sharing rates must be adjusted to be 65% and 60% of the net married couple rate respectively

- 27 The benefits of using the growth rates are:
  - Ministers can decide to make separate decisions around the levels outside of indexation decisions, without having to change the underlying indexation settings
  - Stats NZ frequently make methodological improvements to their data, which is
    more likely to impact on the level of wages (and prices) themselves rather than
    growth rates (due to revising historical data to maintain consistency in the series).
     Under a wage band approach, methodological changes would have an impact on
    social assistance levels and can have significant financial implications.

A higher of wage growth or inflation approach

- 28 Because of the risk of higher inflation than wage growth, you could require that rates be adjusted by whichever is higher out of CPI or wages. However there are issues with such an approach because:
  - This can result in ratcheting of payments because the higher growth rate of wages or inflation is used, it can result in the increases to payment rates being higher than both inflation and wage growth over the long term.
  - Because of the above, it is possible that benefits could increase faster than NZS in the years following higher CPI growth than wage growth. However, as noted earlier such an approach is unlikely as wages generally grow faster than CPI.
- 29 Irrespective of the approach used, we recommend that the measure of wages should be net average ordinary time weekly earnings (per full-time equivalent), which is currently the measure used for NZS. It is important to note that because net wages will be used, this will mean any personal income tax changes will also automatically flow through to beneficiaries (unless rates are deliberately adjusted to avoid this). Personal income tax changes may be considered as part of the Government's response to the Tax Working Group's report.

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30	s 9(2)(f)(iv)	
31	s 9(2)(f)(iv)	
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37	s 9(2)(f)(iv)
38	s 9(2)(f)(iv)
Cor	nfirming your approach to legislation
	g your approach to regionation
39	There are options for you in terms of legislative change, which are in part dependent
	on which payments you wish to index. It also comes down to whether you wish to
	require successive governments to make these adjustments, or whether you simply
	want to commit to these proposals via Cabinet decisions.
40	s 9(2)(f)(iv)
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Indexation Budget Bid: Key policy decisions

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41	s 9(2)(f)(iv)
42	You could also make an initial commitment to annually increase benefit rates 59(2)
	via a Cabinet decision, \$ 9(2)(f)(iv)
43	You may prefer, however, to 'bed in' the indexation changes through legislation as part of the Budget 2019 bid, to ensure that the change occurs and endures into the future.
	While it would be useful for you to signal your broad preference for whether you want
	to include these arrangements in primary legislation for the Budget 2019 changes, the specific details of any such legislation would not need to be settled now.
44	Officials recommend that you begin developing legislative proposals as part of the Budget 2019 bid. Officials will consider the process for this as part of broader advice
	on the legislative process for the other welfare overhaul initiatives.
45	s 9(2)(f)(iv)
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## **Updated financial implications**

47 The table below provides revised cost estimates of these options, both individually and in combination. The estimates used in the previous advice were based on Treasury's TAWA model; we have now obtained more refined estimates which incorporate MSD administrative data for the payments primarily administrated by MSD.

Net fiscal cost	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23
Main benefits to wages	\$13m	\$61m	\$103m	\$137m
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48	In the estimates above, we have also separated out the additional cost of two key
	decisions in this paper s 9(2)(f)(iv)

- 49 Appendix One includes further information on expected impacts of the change, including the likely impact of wage indexation on benefit rates and the impact of different options on the before-housing-cost primary measure of child poverty.
- As noted in previous advice, over time the difference between wage growth and inflation accumulates, and means that the fiscal costs will grow significantly outside of the budget forecast period. § 9(2)(f)(iv)

Indexation options	2028/29
Benefits/wages	\$0.8b
s 9(2)(f)(iv)	

We note that if payment rates are subsequently lifted it will have an impact on the costings above, and even more so on the fiscal costs over a longer time horizon. The fiscal impact of this will be considered as part of the broader response to the WEAG recommendations.

## **Next Steps**

- 52 Should you wish to proceed with a budget bid, officials will provide you and relevant portfolio Ministers with further advice which:
  - summarises the key decisions made to date
  - provides final advice on the short and long-term fiscal implications and poverty impacts of the budget bid
  - depending on your decisions above, provide any further necessary advice to finalise the bid for example, on the proposed legislative process/timeframes
  - provides a letter from relevant portfolio Ministers to the Minister of Finance to submit a Budget Bid.

# APPENDIX ONE: Additional information on the impact of indexation changes

Impact on payment rates

The table below shows the additional increases that would result from wage-indexing main benefits, over and above the expected increases that would result from CPI adjustment under the current status quo.

Description	2020	2021	2022	2023
Job-seeker Support - Single 25 and over	\$3	\$5	\$7	\$10
Job-seeker Support - Married - no children	\$4	\$9	\$12	\$16
Job-seeker Support - Married - with children	\$5	\$10	\$13	\$17
Sole Parent Support - 1 child	\$4	\$8	\$11	\$15
Supported Living Payment - Single 18 years and over	\$3	\$7	\$9	\$12
Supported Living Payment - Couple rate (each)	\$3	\$6	\$8	\$10

#### Modelling of impact on child poverty BHC50 measure

The table below shows TAWA modelling of impacts of the initiative on the BHC50 measure over the forecast period, assuming an implementation date of April 2020. As noted in previous reports, however, the impact on rates of poverty are more likely to be seen over a much longer time horizon, which means that indexation is much more relevant to the long-term targets.

Modelling is not available on the After-Housing-Cost primary measure (AHC50), which significantly constrains our ability to understand the impact of different changes (f) (iv)

